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1.  Introduction 
Education policy-makers have long debated the relative benefits of social promotion 
versus grade retention.  Social promotion is the policy of promoting students from one grade to 
the next, irrespective of their performance.  Advocates claim that even low-performing students 
would benefit from staying with and learning from their peer group, whereas grade retention 
harms students’ self-esteem, does not improve their performance, and increases their likelihood 
of dropping out of school (Shepard and Smith 1989).  To varying degrees, social promotion is 
practiced in countries such as Denmark, Japan, Korea, Norway, Sweden and many states in the 
United States. Countries such as France and most developing countries use grade retention 
extensively as a means to address student performance (Bonvin 2003): the practice of holding 
back underperforming students in the same grade until they attain minimum grade-appropriate 
skills.  Proponents of grade retention believe that waiting until students have attained mastery of 
the curriculum will better prepare them for more advanced work at the higher grades whereas 
social promotion will doom them to falling ever farther behind their classmates. 
There is mixed evidence regarding the relative merits of the two policies.  Reviewing a 
large number of studies of U. S. schools, Holmes (1989) and Jimerson (2001) conclude that 
retained children perform about one-third of a standard deviation below promoted students on 
achievement measures in subsequent school years.1  The adverse effect of grade retention 
appears larger on test scores than on emotional or behavioral outcomes (Jimerson 2001).  Using 
a regression discontinuity design to get a better match between the retained students and 
comparison groups, Roderick and Nagaoka (2005) find that third-grade students who were 
retained under Chicago’s high-stakes testing policy do not yield higher language test scores two 
years after the retention, and that retained sixth graders had lower achievement growth. Focusing 
instead on dropout rates, Grissom and Shepard (1989) find that grade retention increased dropout 
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rates by as much as 20-30 percent, even after controlling for achievement, socioeconomic status 
and gender, although Eide and Showalter (2001) conclude that grade retention has a negative but 
statistically insignificant impact on the probability of dropout in their study. 
Other studies report contrary findings – grade retention improves student achievement by 
allowing students who are ill-prepared for the next grade to catch up academically and 
emotionally.  In impoverished areas such as Brazil’s rural northeast, retained grade-two students 
performed more than half a standard deviation below average before repetition, but performed 
slightly above average after repetition (Gomes-Neto and Hanushek 1994).2  In Burundi, grade 
repetition at the end of the primary cycle is the accepted way by which sixth-grade students 
prepare for a very selective entrance examination that would give them a place in a greatly 
limited secondary school system (Eisemon et al. 1993).  In Chicago, the high-stakes testing-
based promotion policy that increased the grade retention rate of eighth-graders from 1%  to 
10% actually lowered later dropouts because fewer students entered high school ill-prepared 
(Allensworth 2004).  Even Holmes (1989), whose meta-analysis has been cited frequently in 
opposition to grade retention, reports that when retained students are compared with same-grade 
rather than same-age peers, there are positive effects from repeating a grade, although the gains 
may be temporary.3 
 This study examines a different aspect of the debate about grade retention and promotion.  
In particular, we explicitly consider how parents process the information that grade promotion or 
retention provides about student achievement and integrate that information into parental 
decisions regarding their children's schooling.4  In developing countries, even at the earliest 
grades, parents implicitly evaluate whether the value of their schooling dominates the 
opportunity costs of child time outside of school, and these assessments may be influenced by 
whether the child is perceived to be learning from school. 
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We address this question in the context of first-grade and second-grade children in the 
Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP), the smallest and northernmost of Pakistan’s four main 
provinces.  First, we establish the extent to which promotions are based on student performance 
in the classroom.  The teacher’s decision to retain or promote a child could be based on factors 
other than academic performance, including policies on automatic promotion, student 
deportment, and parental preferences.  This leads to a decomposition of promotions into two 
components – one based on observed academic merit and the other based on factors other than 
merit.  We then examine how merit-based and non-merit-based promotions are related to 
continued enrollment versus student dropout. 
Our analysis uses a unique data set collected in the NWFP in 1994.  At that time, the 
NWFP Education Management Information System (NEMIS) was first exploring the use of a 
student assessment system.  Prior to that time, there had not been any formal means by which 
parents or teachers could compare student performance across schools or even across children 
within a school.  Despite this lack of prior knowledge of relative student learning, we find that 
teacher promotion decisions in primary schools are based primarily on student attendance and on 
student skills as measured by performance on tests of mathematics and language.  The 
relationship to test scores is particularly interesting in that the teachers never saw the students' 
performance on the tests, and so they must know which children have mastered the material even 
without aid of formal assessments.  Even more striking, largely illiterate parents appear to base 
their decisions of whether to send the child to school for another year largely on merit-based 
promotions.  Promotions that are not correlated with measured student cognitive attainments 
have a much smaller positive impact on the probability of school continuation.  This finding 
implies that parents make their decisions regarding a child’s continued schooling on the basis of 
perceived learning in the previous year, rather than on promotion or repetition per se.  It would 
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also suggest that if a child's ability to learn in future years is reduced by being placed in a grade 
for which the child is unprepared, then promotion could lead to increased dropout. 
Increasingly, researchers and development agencies have been exploring school-based 
management reforms and increased parental involvement as mechanisms for improving school 
quality and student learning (e.g., Gunnarsson et al. 2004, Umansky and Vegas 2007; World 
Bank 2007)  One of the concerns about decentralized control of local schools, however, is that 
uneducated parents are not able to assess quality and would therefore be unable to advocate for 
quality schools.5  Our findings suggest that, even without external sources of information, 
parents may be better judges of school quality than may have been previously thought. 
2.  The Model 
 This section presents a model of demand for child education in the household, followed 
by a model of the decisions made by teachers and schools about whether or not to promote 
students to the next grade.  As first proposed by Becker (1967) in his Woytinsky Lecture, 
households choose levels of human capital investments by equating the (discounted) expected 
marginal private benefits and the expected marginal private costs of these investments.  
Applying this framework to the demand for child schooling, parental decisions about child 
education depend on the direct and indirect costs of schooling, family income, and expected 
hedonic and/or pecuniary returns to schooling.6  This model generally assumes that costs, 
income, and returns are all known at the time of the decisions.  In reality, information on returns 
is revealed over time and parental decisions can better be modeled as a sequential one. 
Part of the revelation process for parents is learning more about the child’s ability and 
aptitude for school by observing the child’s performance in school.  Each school year, parents 
observe the child’s progress in school through two indicators, whether the child is promoted to 
the next grade and how much the child learns.  Conditional on new information, parents update 
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their decision (as well as aspirations) regarding how many years the child will remain in school.  
Abstracting from any compulsory education law, this model implies that if the child’s progress is 
below parental expectations, then parents will reduce the additional number of years the child 
will be in school. 
 Another part of the revelation process is parents discovering more about the quality of the 
schools their children attend, including the extent to which schools are able to impart new 
knowledge and skills to their children, and about how schools (teachers) assess student 
performance and decide on which students to promote or retain at each grade.  The model below 
incorporates grade promotion decisions into parental decision making about schooling. 
A.  Length of Time in School 
 The human capital model suggests that parents will choose length of time in school in 
order to maximize a child’s lifetime income.  We modify the model slightly by assuming that 
parents choose schooling so as to maximize lifetime discounted utility from their children’s 
schooling and earnings.  Parental utility is assumed to be positively influenced by their 
children’s   schooling through two potential avenues: their children’s enhanced earnings 
potential; and pride in their children’s academic accomplishments.  Both types of returns are 
subject to diminishing marginal utility.   
Case A1: Only child cognitive attainment raises parental utility 
If parents only care about whether their children are learning in school and not on their 
years of schooling , then lifetime discounted utility at time t will depend solely on the human 
capital acquired, qit.  This would characterize parental utility if, for example, parents only valued 
the child's earnings potential and if firms only paid for cognitive attainment and not for years of 
schooling.  In fact, Glewwe (2002) and Hanushek and Kimko (2000) present evidence that it is 
 
 6
only cognitive attainment and not years of schooling that raise earnings.  The parents' net 
discounted utility of the tth year of schooling can be written as 
),,( ititit
t
S CWqV  (1) 
where  is the present value of an additional year of schooling at time t, Wit is the market wage 
earned by a child of age t and knowledge qit, and Cit is the cost of schooling incurred in year t.  
As shown in Figure 1, parents interested in schooling only for its effect on cognitive attainment 
will continue to invest as long as (.) > 0.
t
SV
t
SV
7  Optimal t* occurs where   * * *( , , ) 0.tS it it itV q W C =
 We assume that   The assumption implies that an optimum length of time in 
school exists, given a finite life of length T.  There are several reasons for this assumption.  First 
is the traditional assumption of diminishing marginal utility.  Additionally, as t increases by one 
year, the length of time the child can earn returns on schooling decreases by one year.  Third, as 
years of schooling increase, a child’s human capital, Wit rises.  Because Wit is the opportunity 
cost of schooling in year t, the opportunity cost of schooling increases in t.  Finally, the direct 
cost of schooling, Cit, may also rise as t rises. 
/ 0.tSdV dt <
 The marginal utility of the tth year of schooling implied by (1) presumes that parents 
and/or employers can observe qit.  In practice, qit will be observed with error and skills are 
proxied by the number of years completed by the student, which in turn results directly from a 
series of promotion outcomes from grade to grade.  It is possible that schools provide perfect 
information on student achievement through grade promotion decisions and that employers (and 
parents) are thus able to assess accurately how much students have learned in school.  On the 
other hand, the information content of grade promotion decisions depends on several factors – 
whether promotions are, in fact, based on merit, as measured by student effort, achievement, or 
both; whether they are influenced by pressure from aggressive and powerful parents; and 
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whether they are largely in accordance with a social or automatic promotion policy.  That 
suggests that years of schooling provide only partial information on learning such that employers 
– as well as parents – will have to rely on their own means to assess student performance. 
Case A2: Both promotion and child cognitive attainment raise parental utility 
If the labor market rewards the number of years of schooling attained or if parents get 
utility from their children's promotion independent of their cognitive attainment, then promotions 
will also enter the parents discounted utility from the tth year of schooling: 
),,,( itititit
t
p PCWqV  (2) 
where Pit indicates if child i is promoted in year t.  We can then compare years of schooling with 
and without promotions.  Parents interested in promotions as well as learning will choose length 
of time in school t** such that ** ** ** **( , , , )
t
p it it it itV q W C P 0= .  As illustrated in Figure 1, the optimal 
length of time in school could rise or fall relative to the case where Pit has no value.  In other 
words, parents could raise or lower the amount of time a child is enrolled in school if the number 
of grades completed is valued, independent of qit.8  The rationale is that the opportunity cost of 
schooling rises more rapidly when promotions (independent of qit) are valued, even as the 
marginal returns to a year of schooling are increased.   
 The key conclusion from this section is that if automatic promotions are to have a 
positive effect on a child’s length of time in school, then parents must derive some utility from 
promotion, independent of the utility derived from actual learning.  That will mean that the 
probability of continuing in school will differ between promoted and nonpromoted students, 
holding qit constant.  However, we cannot predict whether promoted students will be more or 
less likely to continue in school. 
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B.  Promotions 
 We require a mechanism to distinguish between a promotion decision that is purely 
merit-based and a promotion decision based on nonmerit factors.  We first characterize the two 
polar cases for teacher promotion decisions, one based exclusively on student performance and 
the other based on other factors, and then we describe how actual promotions are a mixture of 
the two.  
Case B1. Merit-based promotion 
At one extreme, suppose that student i’s merit in year t and school j is given by qijt.  Merit 
is determined by a human capital production process 
( , ,ijt ijt ijt ijtq f A M L= )  (3) 
where Aijt is student attendance during the year, and Mijt and Lijt are math and language skills at 
the end of the year.  Conditional on Aijt, Mijt, and Lijt, the teacher derives an estimate of merit,  
which differs from actual merit, qijt, by a random error, εijt.   There is also a threshold level of 
merit, 
e
ijtq
min
jq  necessary to justify promotion to the next grade in school j.9  Hence, the promotion 
decision can be written as, 
min
min
1
0
e j
ijt ijt ijt ijt
e j
ijt ijt ijt
P if q q q
if q q q
ε
ε
= = − ≥
= = − <
 (4) 
Pijt  is a discrete variable that takes the value of one if the student is promoted and zero if the 
student is failed. 
 The promotion decision (4) can be estimated by rearranging terms such that 
min
min
1
0
j
ijt ijt ijt
j
ijt ijt
P if q q
if q q
ε
ε
= −
= − <
≥
 (4’) 
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If εijt is distributed normally with zero mean, then (4’) can be estimated as a probit equation with 
the elements of qijt from (4) and min
jq  as regressors.  If schools hold strictly to a merit-based 
promotions policy, observed promotions will fail to sort students correctly into qualified 
(qijt ≥ minjq ) and unqualified (qijt< minjq ) groups only due to random errors in measuring merit, 
εijt.10 
Case B2. Non-merit based promotion 
 Promotion policy may be based on factors other than merit, as would be the case of a 
strict social promotion policy.  Teachers may also base promotions on parental status in the 
community or a perceived need for teachers to curry favor with parents.  The likelihood that non-
merit factors will enter the promotion decision increases, the more that parents value promotion 
itself, independent of their child's cognitive attainment.  In the extreme case, only non-merit 
factors, Z, affect promotion.  We characterize the aggregation of the non-merit factors as  
ijt ijt ijtI Z β ς= +  (5) 
The promotion decision based on index I can be written as, 
 
1 0
0 0
ijt ijt ijt it
ijt ijt it
P if I Z
if I Z
β ς
β ς
= = + ≥
= = + <
 
which can be rearranged to be 
1
0
ijt ijt ijt
ijt ijt
P if Z
if Z
β ς
β ς
= ≥−
= < −
 (6) 
Case B3. Hybrid promotions 
Promotion policies are unlikely to follow either of the two polar cases of merit-based and 
non-merit based promotions, suggesting that the actual promotion policy can be characterized as 
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a convex combination of the two polar cases. Using γ as the weight placed on merit factors, the 
promotion policy becomes 
min1 (1 ) (1
0 ;
0 1
j
ijt ijt ijt ijt it ijtP if q q Z
otherwise
where
γ γ β γε γ
γ
⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤= − + − ≥ − −⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦
=
≤ ≤
) eς =
 (7) 
This hybrid promotion decision returns the strict merit-based policy if γ = 1, and the strict 
non-merit policy if γ = 0.  This specification adds another influence on promotion decisions, γ, 
which might depend on the overall mission of the school, its general policy or practice with 
respect to promotions and repetitions, or the pressure it receives from parents to promote their 
children.   If there are no reliable nonschool-based standardized tests of student achievement, 
then teachers might have more leeway to discount merit-based factors and set γ = 0.  In fact, 
absent external validation of student performance, teachers may have an incentive to fool 
illiterate parents into thinking the students are learning more than they really are. 
 Two observations must be made about (7).  First, it is difficult to determine from data 
whether non-merit based promotions are due to noisy student evaluations or a low γ.  A low γ 
automatically diminishes the value of student performance.  Secondly, a school that values merit 
in general must improve its method of evaluating students if it is to appropriately reward student 
performance.  Even if γ  were high, if student assessments are wildly inaccurate, the impression 
that will be transmitted to parents is that merit is not valued. 
 In the estimation we derive a statistical decomposition of promotions into merit- versus 
non-merit-based components.  While we are not able to identify γ structurally, the reduced-form 
representation does enable us to determine whether unearned grade promotions encourage 
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parents to keep their children in school.  Next, we turn to parental choices regarding their child's 
schooling. 
C. Performance, Promotion and Persistence 
We considered two alternative views of child persistence in school:  parental decisions 
can be driven by the child's performance in school as in equation (1), or by both performance and 
promotion as in equation (2).  Note that promotion will be positively correlated with child 
performance as long as γ > 0 in equation (7), even if promotion is not solely merit-based.  
Consequently, distinguishing between equations (1) and (2) requires that the incidence of 
promotion be decomposed into a component correlated with merit and a component that is 
uncorrelated with merit.  This can be accomplished by predicting promotion on the basis of 
equations (3) and (4’), the strict merit-based model.  Then, student performance will be measured 
by the merit-based component of the promotion, .  The difference between 
actual promotion and the predicted merit-based promotion, [
( | , , )ijt ijt ijt ijtE P A M L
(ijt iP E | , , )]jt ijt ijt ijtP A M L− , can then 
be used as the incidence of promotion that is uncorrelated with qijt.  The parents' decision to keep 
the child in school approximates equation (2) by 
( , , )
[ ( , , )]
t
p ijt ijt ijt ijt q ijt w ijt c
t
ijt ijt ijt ijt ijt p ijt p ijt
V E P A M L W C
P E P A M L
δ δ δ
.δ ε υ ξ
= + +
+ − + = +
 (8) 
where  is a set of parameters to be estimated, δ tpυ  is the observable component of parental 
marginal utility from an additional year of child schooling and ijtξ is a random error.  Child 
persistence in school is governed by  
1 1
0
t
ijt p ijtE if
otherwise
υ ξ+ = > −
=
 (9) 
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where Eijt+1 =1 if the child is enrolled in school the following year.   
3.  Data Sources 
The empirical analysis uses data from a series of survey questionnaires designed by the 
authors and fielded by NEMIS staff under the supervision of Rafiq Jaffer. The survey covered a 
representative sample of 257 government, mosque and private schools that were first surveyed 
by Ali and Reed (1994) as part of a textbook study.  In each school, we selected one teacher in 
each of the first three grades; this selection was random if there was more than one teacher in a 
grade.  We collected data on teachers and children in kachi or kindergarten, pakki or grade one, 
and grade two, but our analysis focuses only on the last two grades as the kachi were too young 
to take the tests.  The survey elicited information on teachers’ socioeconomic backgrounds.  
Similarly, in each class we randomly selected two students for inclusion in the household survey.  
Enumerators visited those households to obtain information on the sample child and on the 
socioeconomic attributes of the child's family.  Variable definitions and sample statistics are 
reported in the Appendix.11 
 During the course of the school year, the enumerators conducted two unannounced spot 
checks on teacher and student absenteeism.  The first check occurred in the first two months of 
the term, and the second occurred in the final two months.  Data on monthly student and teacher 
attendance over the school year were also obtained from the school’s attendance register.  The 
average teacher spot-check absence rate was 19% which is comparable to the absence rates 
found by Chaudhury et al. (2006) for six developing countries using similar methods to those 
employed in our study.  Students had a lower average spot-check absenteeism rate of 13%.12   
 Grade-one level exams in mathematics and languages were administered to the second-
graders at the start of the academic year, and to first-graders at the end of the term.  The tests 
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were designed by the late Sar Khan.  The exam was based on the official curriculum which all 
schools, public or private, were expected to follow.  The curriculum sets minimum objectives for 
each grade level, and the exam assessed student attainment of these minimum competencies for 
grade one or pakki.  The language test was in the language of instruction to avoid giving undue 
advantage to any one language group.13  Out of a possible score of 20, average scores for the 
math and language tests were 14.3 and 11.3, respectively. 
 Lastly, enumerators returned to the schools at the end of the school year and at the 
beginning of the next to collect information on which students had been promoted and which 
students were continuing in school the following year.  If a student was not enrolled again in the 
same school, enumerators obtained information on whether that student had transferred to 
another school or had dropped out.  Enumerators were able to find the enrollment status of all 
but 6 of the original sample children; we drop those observations from the analysis of child 
persistence in school.   
 Of the sample of 736 children for whom we have full information, 94.4% were promoted 
and 95% remained in school the following year (Table 1).  Of those not promoted, 18% dropped 
out of school.  Of those promoted, only 4% dropped out of school.   Clearly, promotion and 
persistence are positively correlated, but we require further investigation to assess whether the 
correlation is due to learning or to the state of being promoted. 
 Because we are interested in estimating the relationship between achievement and 
promotion, our working sample does not include those children who did not take the 
mathematics and language exams that were administered in class.   When these children are 
added to the sample, the fraction not promoted rose from 5.6% to 9.2% and the fraction not 
continuing in school the following year rose from 4.8% to 7.9%.  Therefore, the children in our 
working sample are more likely to be promoted and to continue in school than the universe of 
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students.  These differences could alter our conclusions regarding the relative importance of 
merit-based versus social promotions on the likelihood of continuing in school, a possibility we 
investigate directly.   
4.  Empirical Analysis and Results 
 First, we analyze the determinants of student promotion.  We then use those findings to 
embed predicted promotions into our analysis of student continuation. 
A.  Student Promotion 
 We estimate two versions of the promotion equation, the pure merit-based promotion 
specification (4’) and the hybrid specification (7).  Factors reflecting student merit include the 
test scores for mathematics and language achievement.  These tests were designed to establish 
the extent to which students have learned material required by the nationally approved 
curriculum.  Our other measure of student performance is the student’s official attendance 
record, on the presumption that daily school attendance is positively correlated with learning.  
As mentioned above, spot-checks of student attendance confirmed the reliability of the official 
attendance record. 
 A school’s required performance for promotion, min
jq , is assumed to vary with the 
school’s average score on the math and language achievement tests.  This would imply that it 
would be harder for a student to pass in a school in which students perform better on average.  
Since the performance level required for promotion should rise with grade level, a dummy 
variable for grade two is also added.  Anything that raises the performance standard should lower 
the probability of promotion. 
 Measures of Z include mother’s and father’s highest grade attained, whether there is only 
a single parent in the household, and household income.  Past studies in various countries have 
found that grade retention is higher for children who come from poorer homes and schools 
 
 15
(Bonvin 2003; Eide and Showalter 2001; Gomes-Neto and Hanushek 1994; Hauser, Pager and 
Simmons 2004; Mete 2004; Patrinos and Psacharopoulos 1996), a reason why appropriate 
identification has been a methodological issue for the studies that estimate the impact of grade 
retention on student performance.  
Parents with high education or income would be expected to have more power or ability 
to influence teachers.  Variables that might reflect parental incentives to do so include the 
number of younger siblings a child has (since parents may have a particular interest in the 
success of their first-born child), whether the child is male (since parents may have a stronger 
desire for their sons to succeed), and whether the child is healthy (since education may be more 
valuable if the child is expected to be able to reap the benefits of schooling for a longer period of 
time).  Finally, two measures of how well the teacher can assess student performance are used – 
the teacher’s own attendance in class and class size.14  The more frequently the teacher is absent 
and the larger the class, the less the teacher is able to know a given child’s ability, and 
potentially the lower the weight that the teacher can place on merit, γ. 
 Results are reported in Table 2.  The estimated effects of the variables on promotion 
probability are reported in Table 3.  The first important result is that the pure merit-based 
promotion specification is rejected in favor of the hybrid promotion model.  The test of the null 
hypothesis that the coefficients on the non-merit elements of the regression are jointly zero is 
soundly rejected.   
 That said, the promotion model works well.  Superior performance on either the math or 
language test significantly increases promotion probability, even though there is no systematic 
testing system in NWFP.  In fact, the teachers did not have the results of these exams at the time 
they made their decisions on whom to promote.  To illustrate the magnitude of the impacts of 
these test scores, we estimate the predicted probability of promotion at the highest and lowest 
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realization of each test score, holding all other regressors at their sample means.  As shown in 
Table 3, the score on the math exam raises the probability of promotion by 7 percentage points 
as we go from lowest to highest math score.  The range of promotion probabilities attributable to 
the variation in language test scores is wider at 10 percentage points.    
Promotions are even more strongly tied to student attendance.  The predicted promotion 
probability ranges from 21 to 99 percent as the proportion of school days attended varies from 
zero to one.  Promotion probability is not strongly tied to a child's performance relative to other 
children in the school.  Average test scores have a small and statistically insignificant effect on 
promotion probability.  This suggests that promotion standards may not differ significantly 
across schools. 
 Three factors stand out in the vector of non-merit influences on student promotion.  First, 
children with younger siblings are more likely to pass the grade.  This is consistent with the 
presumption that there will be pressure to pass the older of several children in a family.  Schools 
may promote older children so as not to discourage the enrollment of younger children in the 
family.  Nevertheless the effect on promotions is very small: students with the largest number of 
younger siblings are only 4 percentage points more likely to pass than students with no younger 
siblings.   
 Second, student promotion is influenced by teacher attendance.  As teacher attendance 
increases, all else equal, the probability of promotion decreases.  Students should perform better 
when the teacher is present, but these regressions control for student test scores.  One plausible 
explanation for this is that frequently absent teachers have little merit-based information upon 
which to base promotion decisions and thus cannot defend a decision to hold back a child for 
another year.15 However, student promotion varies only modestly with teacher attendance:  less 
than a 1 percentage point difference between classrooms with absent versus present teachers.    
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 Finally, children from wealthier households are more likely to be promoted.  It may be 
that wealthier parents pressure teachers to promote their children, or it may be that wealthier 
families invest more in their children's schooling outside of school.  In any event, again the range 
of promotion results associated with household wealth is small--less than 5 percentage points 
separating the promotions of the poorest and wealthiest children.   
 We conclude that our nonmerit influences on promotions are much less important in 
explaining the likelihood of promotion than were test scores or child attendance, and so teachers 
in these NWFP schools based their promotions more on merit than nonmerit factors.  Although 
we cannot isolate a numerical estimate of γ, the implication is that the weight placed on merit 
promotions is high and so γ is close to 1. 
 Because of gender differences in schooling in Pakistan, we also analyzed promotion 
separately for boys and girls.  We could not reject the null hypothesis that the process governing 
promotions was the same for boys and girls.  The coefficients are very consistent in sign and 
significance across the boys' and girls' equations.  For both, it is test scores and attendance that 
drive the promotion process with nonmerit factors playing only minor roles in numerical impact, 
even when they have significant coefficients.   
B.  Student Continuation 
 Next, we attempt to identify the extent to which the occurrence of a promotion affects the 
probability that a student persists in school.  We estimate two specifications of the probability 
that a student who is currently enrolled will remain in school or drop out in the subsequent year.  
The first includes the dummy variable, Pijt, which indicates whether or not the child was 
promoted.  The second decomposes the observed promotion decision into , the component 
predicted by the merit-based specification (column 4 in Table 2), and , the component of 
m
ijtPˆ
m
ijtPˆ−ijtP
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the promotion that is not explained by merit.  Because the estimations using the decomposed 
promotions require a two-step process, we correct the standard errors using a bootstrapping 
procedure.16 
 The results are reported in Table 4.  The first striking result is that only promotion 
matters; the probability of remaining in school is not affected by household, school or child 
attributes.  The null hypothesis that the coefficients other than promotion are jointly equal to 
zero could not be rejected at standard confidence levels.17 The lack of importance of these child, 
household, and school attributes is less surprising in that the sample is preconditioned on the 
child being in school the previous year.  Variation in household attributes may have an impact on 
the likelihood that a child ever attends school, but our sample only includes children whose 
household and school attributes were sufficient to induce them to attend.  Nevertheless, even 
with this selected and thus relatively homogeneous group of households, promotion strongly 
influences the decision to send the child to school the following year.  
 The high correlation between promotions and continuation in school would seem to 
support a automatic or social promotion policy.  However, a promotion may signal only that the 
child is prepared for more advanced schooling, leading parents to continue to invest in their 
child's time in school.  In that case, the promotion itself would have no impact on the child's 
persistence in school.    In column 2, we replace Pijt with our decomposition into merit and non-
merit based promotions.  It is the merit component of the promotion that drives the continuation 
effect.  While both components have statistically significant effects, the estimated effect is much 
larger for the merit than for the non-merit component of the promotion.  When we compute the 
implied probability of continuing in school at the highest and lowest values of and  
toward the bottom of Table 4, we find that the child with the lowest merit component is 25 
m
ijtPˆ
m
ijt ijt
ˆP P−
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percentage points less likely to enroll in school the following year than is the child with the 
highest merit component.  The range of enrollment probabilities from the bottom to the top of the 
non-merit based promotion is only 11 percentage points. 
   One might be concerned that promotion is endogenous, perhaps because teachers are 
more likely to promote children who have precommitted to staying in school the following year.  
Our instruments for promotion mitigate against that problem.  The two tests were administered 
by the enumerators and the teachers never saw the test results, so the tests are outside the 
teacher's influence.  Student attendance registers were validated by spot checks of student 
attendance, and so they also appear to be outside the teacher's control.  Consequently, our merit-
based promotion measure will not be clouded by possible teacher motives to promote children 
who intend to return to school.   
 On the other hand, the non-merit promotion component would be clouded by such 
incentives if teachers had those incentives.  If this non-merit component were endogenous and 
correlated with the other regressors in the model, its inclusion would bias the other coefficients.   
In our robustness checks, we found that the coefficients were not greatly affected by the 
inclusion or exclusion of non-merit based promotion.  Consequently, endogeneity does not 
appear to be a serious problem with the interpretation of the coefficient on either promotion 
component. 
 We can further subdivide the non-merit component into unexpected failures (negative 
surprises on the promotion decision) and unexpected promotions.  Presumably it is the latter that 
most closely fits the social promotion concept.  We find that most of the impact of the non-merit 
component is attributable to the negative effect on continuation of failing a student who should 
have passed based on test scores or attendance.  Promoting an undeserving student has only a 
very modest positive effect on the likelihood that the child will continue in school. 
 
 20
 Dividing the sample into boys and girls, we find that only merit-based promotion retains 
statistical significance and the size of that effect is much larger than the impact of non-merit 
based promotion on student persistence.  Nevertheless, when we test the null hypothesis of 
equality of coefficients across the boys' and girls' equations, we cannot reject equality at standard 
significance levels, and so we consider the estimates in the first two columns as more precise. 
 As pointed out in section 3, our working sample includes only the children who were in 
school during the survey visit and were able to take the math and language tests .  Those who did 
not take the tests include a higher fraction of students who were not subsequently promoted and 
who did not continue in school, and so our conclusions may be affected by sample selection.  To 
address this issue, we replicated the entire analysis without the test scores and used as a proxy 
indicator of merit the student’s annual attendance rate.  The marginal effect of the unpredicted 
promotion rises from 0.055 to 0.13, suggesting a higher effect of the surprise element of 
promotion on student continuation.  However, the impact of the merit-based component also 
increased by a similar proportion from 0.14 to 0.31, so our conclusion that student continuation 
is driven largely by merit-based promotion continues to hold. 
4.  Conclusions 
Previous studies have estimated the cost burden that grade retention imposes on school 
systems in developing countries.  For example, Schiefelbein and Wolff (1992) estimate that ten 
million repeaters each year in ten South American countries cost these countries about one 
billion dollars annually.  Gomes-Neto and Hanushek (1994) estimate that the average cost of 
grade retention as a strategy for raising test scores by one point was about one-fourth to one-
third of the average student cost in Brazil’s rural northeast region. From this perspective, grade 
retention is very costly for countries with grade retention rates at or above 20 percent (e.g. 
Brazil, Nepal, and Cameroon).  But is automatic or social promotion an appropriate and effective 
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remedy for this problem?  Increasing the pass-through rates of students in a mechanical way 
through automatic promotion is not likely to be the right remedy in the difficult situations under 
which students in low-income settings must study – impoverished home conditions, few 
educated role models in the home of community, poorly equipped schools, poorly trained 
teachers.   
There is strong evidence that parents make and implement decisions about their 
children’s schooling even at the early grades of the primary cycle. Primary schooling is now 
compulsory in nearly all countries, yet not all children in the relevant age group enroll in school. 
This suggests that in their parents’ eyes the returns to schooling do not outweigh the (direct and 
opportunity) costs of going to school. In addition, parents seem willing to bypass a low-quality 
public school in favor of a better-quality but more remote public school (Gertler and Glewwe 
1990) or a better-quality private school that charges higher fees (Andrabi et al. 2007).  For these 
reasons, a policy of automatic promotion that assumes away parental decisionmaking would not 
prevent children from dropping out early if they are not learning what they are expected to learn.  
Our results indicate that grade promotion raises the probability of a student continuing in 
school when that promotion is based on student performance, not when promotion is 
uncorrelated with student achievement.  Moreover, contrary to some arguments, illiterate and 
poorly educated parents appear able to discern their children's academic progress independently 
of information on test scores and to use this information in deciding whether to keep their 
children in school for another year.  The implication for policymakers is that it would be difficult 
to prevent early dropouts and raise the numbers of children who complete schooling without 
improvements in the quality of the basic education system—or without effective supplementary 
or remedial programs to address the needs of low-performing students.18 This is an immense 
challenge in the world’s poorest countries where dramatic expansions in school enrollment have 
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come at the price of quality (World Bank 2007).  
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Endnotes
1 Both reviews (Holmes 1989; Jimerson 2001) raise concerns about the soundness of 
methodology.  Many of the earlier studies Holmes (1989) reviewed do not appropriately control 
for differences in the characteristics of students.  Only 25 of the 63 studies used matched 
comparison designs; only 16 studies matched students on prior achievement, and only 8 studies 
matched students on characteristics that are generally found to predict grade repetition. In both 
reviews, however, those that followed matched retained and promoted students apparently found 
larger negative effects.   
2 The study tracked a sample of schools during the period 1981-85; of 2,619 students in the 
second grade in 1981, 127 students were still in the second grade in 1985 (Gomes-Neto and 
Hanushek 1994). 
3 Jacob and Lefgren (2004) find that retained third-graders in Chicago had higher test scores one 
year after retention but, two years after retention, these gains had declined substantially. 
4 Eide and Showalter (2001) evaluated parental decisions regarding grade retention in their study 
of the returns to grade retention for high school students in the United States. They model the 
parental decision as depending on whether the child’s earnings net of schooling costs are higher 
or lower from grade retention.  Controlling for endogeneity of grade retention, white students do 
get a benefit from grade retention in lower dropout rates and higher labor market earnings. 
5 These concerns, among others, are reviewed by Ahmad et al (2005) and Bardhan (2002, 2005). 
6 See, for example, Behrman and Deolalikar (1991); Alderman, Orazem and Paterno (2001); 
Anderson, King and Wang (2003) for studies on developing countries. 
7 A similar model with similar implications can be expressed in terms of discounted lifetime 
income. 
8 Grade repetition, however, can dilute marginal returns to each year spent in school.  Behrman 
and Deolalikar (1991) examined the effect of high repetition rates on returns to primary 
education in Indonesia and found those rates to be extremely overestimated.  Under alternative 
estimates of repetition rates, these rates are overstated by 82-114 percent for the below-
completed-primary level and by 38-78 percent for the completed primary category. 
9 Bedi and Marshall (2002) model day-to-day school attendance as an outcome of parental 
schooling decisions, and like parental decisions about enrollment, they find it is affected by the 
expected benefits as measured by an associated increase in test scores and by the quality of 
school facilities.   
10 In their study on Brazil, Gomes-Neto and Hanushek (1994) found that promotion rates were 
directly related to students’ test scores. Each 10 points on the Portuguese achievement test (with 
a standard deviation of approximately 25 points) reduced the repetition probabilities by 1 
percent, while the effect of the mathematics achievement test is half of this. Since the mean 
observed repetition rate in the sample was only 4 percent in 1983, these merit effects are 
significant. 
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11 Our choice of which school and household measures to use was related to the frequency of 
response.  For example, distance from the home to the school was not answered by 25 
households.  Our results are not affected by the inclusion or exclusion of the distance to school 
(the average is under 1 kilometer, and so this is not surprising), and so we only report the results 
using the larger sample where school distance is excluded. 
12 Das et al. (2007) also found that in Zambia, spot-check absenteeism rates were lower for 
students than teachers.  In Zambia, the higher teacher absenteeism is due to AIDS illnesses and 
deaths.  In NWFP, the absenteeism is apparently a result of an implicit contract in which present 
teachers take on the burden of their absent colleagues which allows teachers to be absent more 
frequently in multiple teacher schools than in single teacher schools.  
13 Although Pashto is the main language in the NWFP, the province has many other languages 
spoken, including Hindko, Punjabi, Persian and Urdu. 
14 We use the spot check observations on teacher attendance rather than the official teacher 
attendance.  The official attendance was nearly 95 percent, but the spot check attendance 
averaged only 80 percent. 
15 Das et al. (2007) find that a 5-percent increase in teacher’s absence rate in Zambia reduces 
learning by 4-8 percent of average gains over the school year.  They explain this reduction in 
learning not only being due to a reduction in contact time but also due to a decrease in 
preparation time for class by teachers.  
16 Bootstrapped standard errors were nearly identical to the original standard errors.  Estimation 
using a linear probability model yielded similar results.  
17 The Χ2 (10) statistic was 13.6 which has a marginal significance level of 0.14.  The 
corresponding test statistics for column 2 in Table 4 was Χ2 (10) = 12.6 with a marginal 
significance level of 0.18. 
18 Two studies which measure the impact of supplementary programs indicate that remedial 
programs can help at-risk students.  Jacob and Lefgren (2004) evaluate the combined impact of 
Chicago’s testing-based grade retention policy and a linked summer remedial program.  They 
find a modest positive gain in test scores for low-achieving students, although only for younger 
(third grade) students, not for older (sixth grade) students.  In India, a small experimental project 
provided in-school support to struggling third- and fourth-graders through a young woman 
(“balsakhi”) from the community who worked on basic literacy and numeracy skills with the 
students for two hours out of a four-hour school day (Banerjee et al. 2007).  The program 
evaluation finds that this remedial class increased average test scores by 0.28 of a standard 
deviation for all children in treatment schools, mostly due to large gains at the bottom of the test-
score distribution.  This positive gain vanished a year after the program ended but the evaluation 
suggests that extra classroom help for low-performing students has the potential to address 
learning deficits. 
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Table 1: Distribution of children by promotion and continuation status, working sample 
 Continue  
Promoted No Yes Total 
  No 1.0% 4.7% 5.6% 
  Yes 3.8% 90.5% 94.4% 
Total 4.8% 95.2% 100.0% 
Number of children 35 701 736 
Source: Authors' compilations based on survey data.  The sample size is based on the subset of the full sample for whom all 
information including test scores was available.  Including children who did not sit for the exam, the sample increases to 
904, 9.2% are not promoted and 7.9% do not continue in school the following year. 
 
  
26
Table 2 :  Probit Analysis of Student Promotion  
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Variable Full sample Boys Girls Full sample Boys Girls 
Student monthly attendance 0.128** 0.109* 0.040** 0.184** 0.127* 0.227** 
 (4.57) (2.40) (3.27) (3.98) (2.27) (3.10) 
Math achievement test score/100 0.198* 0.295* 0.041 0.321** 0.388* 0.185 
 (2.18) (2.35) (1.23) (2.20) (2.31) (0.82) 
Language achievement test score/100 0.327** 0.328* 0.106** 0.482** 0.446* 0.507* 
 (3.07) (2.03) (3.76) (2.97) (2.15) (2.34) 
Grade 2 -0.012 -0.010 -0.005 -0.011 -0.008 -0.018 
 (1.54) (0.97) (1.71) (0.93) (0.55) (0.89) 
School average math score/100 0.053 0.075 -0.010 -0.070 0.127 -0.174 
 (0.28) (0.24) (0.21) (0.24) (0.32) (0.50) 
School average language score/100 -0.286 -0.278 0.081* -0.384 -0.386 -0.213 
 (1.51) (0.87) (1.94) (1.28) (0.93) (0.68) 
Teacher spot-check attendance  -0.066** -0.085** -0.017*    
 (3.17) (2.83) (2.04)    
Number of students/100 -0.005 0.013 0.003    
 (0.21) (0.37) (0.44)    
Male 0.002 · ·    
 (0.27)      
Mother's education 0.0001 -0.007 -0.0002    
 (0.09) (0.03) (0.30)    
Father's education -0.0006 -0.093 -0.0001    
 (0.48) (0.50) (0.33)    
Single Parent -0.0007 0.001 0.0009    
 (0.05) (0.06) (0.22)    
Number of younger siblings 0.010** 0.010* 0.002**    
 (3.28) (2.26) (2.65)    
Usually healthy? 0.0024 -0.015 0.011    
 (0.14) (0.95) (0.94)    
Household income 0.004* 0.003 0.0008*    
 (2.48) (1.61) (2.38)    
       
Log Likelihood -114.4 -82.2 -27.5 -125.4 -87.9 -35.7 
R2 0.28 0.24 0.49 0.21 0.19 0.28 
N 736 508 228 736 508 228 
       
χ2 for H0: equal coefficients between boys 
& girls 
9.31   3.58   
χ2 for H0: Performance matters, joint test 
of the first 3 coefficients 
41.5**   41.9**   
χ2 for H0: Home and school attributes 
matter, joint test of the last 9 coefficients 
23.1**      
Notes: All results are converted into marginal effects of the variable on the probability of promotion.   
Z-statistics corrected for clustering at the school level are reported in in parentheses.   
* significant at 5% 
** significant at 1%
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Table 3:  The Range of Promotion Outcomes by Range of Values of the Regressors  
 
 1 2 3 4 
Variable Full sample Full sample Boys Girls 
Student monthly attendance 0.205 to 0.992 0.236 to 0.984 0.544 to 0.979 0.025 to 
0.994 
     
Math achievement test score 0.924 to 0.996 0.91 to 0.986 0.946 to 0.987 0.912 to 0.987
     
Language achievement test score 0.887 to 0.999 0.874 to 0.994 0.829 to 0.997 0.898 to 
0.992 
     
Grade 2 0.989 to 0.977    
     
School average math score 0.977 to 0.989    
     
School average language score 0.987 to 0.932    
     
Teacher  spot-check attendance 0.998 to 0.996    
     
Number of students 0.985 to 0.978    
     
Male 0.983 to 0.985    
     
Mother's education 0.984 to 0.986    
     
Father's education 0.987 to 0.976    
     
Single Parent 0.985 to 0.984    
     
Number of younger siblings 0.959 to 0.999    
     
Usually healthy? 0.982 to 0.984    
     
Household income 0.952 to 0.999    
Table 1 column from which 
ranges are computed  
1 4 5 6 
Note: Estimated ranges are evaluated at sample means, using the coefficients from Table 2.  The estimated 
ranges reflect predicted probabilities of promotion at the minimum and maximum values of the variable, 
holding all other variables at their sample mean values.  Bolded ranges correspond to variables with 
significant coefficients in the underlying estimation 
 
 21
Table 4:  Probit Analysis of Student Continuation 
 
Variable Full Sample Full Sample Boys Girls Boys  Girls 
Grade 2 0.0000 0.001 -0.007 0.014 -0.005 0.013 
(0.00) (0.05) (0.53) (0.52) (0.42) (0.46) 
Teacher spot-check attendance 0.042 0.032 0.091* -0.130 0.085* -0.167 
(0.88) (0.76) (2.18) (1.61) (2.11) (1.84) 
Male 0.022 0.020 · · · · 
(1.23) (1.15)     
Mother's education 0.003 0.003 0.004 -0.0007 0.004 -0.0014 
(0.61) (0.55) (1.00) (0.14) (0.98) (0.28) 
Father's education -0.003 -0.003 -0.005** -0.0001 -0.005** 0.0001 
(1.32) (1.05) (2.66) (0.03) (2.62) (0.01) 
Single Parent -0.006 -0.006 -0.01 -0.027 -0.010 -0.028 
(0.25) (0.20) (0.44) (0.46) (0.43) (0.48) 
Younger siblings 0.004 0.004 0.005 -0.003 0.004 -0.003 
(0.58) (0.49) (0.74) (0.26) (0.62) (0.28) 
Usually healthy? 0.014 0.017 -0.005 0.030 -0.004 0.048 
(0.42) (0.57) (0.17) (0.50) (0.14) (0.80) 
Household income -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.0009 -0.0007 -0.0009 
(0.81) (0.74) (0.42) (0.38) (0.53) (0.35) 
Actual promotion,  ijtP 0.123**  0.064 0.268**   
(2.84)  (1.73) (2.73)   
Performance-based promotion,  mijtPˆ  0.139*   0.107* 0.280* 
 (2.02)   (2.03) (2.10) 
Promotion based on other factors,  mijt ijtˆ(P P )−  0.055* (2.19) 
  0.024 
(1.02) 
0.095 
(1.69) 
      
Log likelihood -131.7 -131.1 -74.1 -49.9 -73.4 -49.2 
R2 0.06 0.07 0.12 0.10 0.13 0.11 
N 730 730 504 226 504 226 
Range:  ijtP 0.84 to 0.96  0.91 to 0.98 0.68 to 0.95 
Range:  mijtPˆ  0.72 to 0.97   0.74 to 0.98 0.40 to .96
Range:  mijt ijtˆP P−  0.87 to 0.98   0.94 to 0.98 0.77 to 0.98
 Unexpected Faila  -1 0ˆ m
ijt ijt
P P≤ ≤−  0.87 to 0.96   0.94 to 0.97 0.77 to 0.95
 Unexpected Passa 0 1  ˆ mijt ijtP P≤ ≤−  0.96 to 0.98   0.97 to 0.98 0.95 to 0.98
χ2 for H0: equal coefficients between boys & 
girls 
15.4 17.0    
Notes: All results are converted into marginal effects of the variable on the probability of promotion.   Z-statistics 
corrected for clustering at the school level are reported in in parentheses.  We further correct the z-statistics using a 
bootstrapping procedure with 200 draws with replacement in the columns using a two-step estimation procedure.  
The estimated ranges reflect predicted probabilities of promotion at the minimum and maximum values of the 
variable, holding all other variables at their sample mean values.   
* significant at 5% 
** significant at 1% 
a The unexpected component of the fail is the gap between the fail realization ( P =0) and the predicted probability 
that the child passes.  The unexpected component of a pass is the gap between the pass realization ( =1) and the 
predicted probability of a pass.  
ijt
Pit
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 Appendix Table: Sample Means of Variables  
 
Variable Description All children Boys Girls 
Promotion =1 if the child is promoted 0.94 0.94 0.94 
 (0.23) (0.23) (0.23) 
Continuation =1 if the child is enrolled the next 0.95 0.96 0.93 
 School year (0.21) (0.20) (0.25) 
Male 0.68   
 (0.47)   
Student attendance Average monthly attendance 0.92 0.93 0.90 
 Taken from school records (0.09) (0.08) (0.11) 
Math achievement test score 14.3 14.2 14.5 
 (5.4) (5.3) (5.6) 
Language achievement test score 11.3 11.0 12.0 
 (6.3) (6.0) (4.6) 
Grade 2 =1 if child is in grade 2 0.50 0.51 0.46 
 (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) 
Teacher attendance Average spot-check attendance, 0.81 0.81 0.80 
 By school (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) 
Number of students Total number of students in school 23.1 21.8 26.0 
 (16.2) (15.0) (18.2) 
Single Parent Either only one parent or parent 
reports no schooling 
0.39 
(0.49) 
0.41 
(0.49) 
0.35 
(0.48) 
Mother's education Mother’s highest grade attended 0.96 0.87 1.20 
 (2.50) (2.33) (2.77) 
Father's education Father’s highest grade attended 4.8 4.36 5.76 
 (4.99) (4.75) (5.4) 
Younger siblings Number of younger siblings 1.60 1.53 1.80 
 (1.24) (1.16) (1.37) 
Usually healthy? =1 if the child is usually healthy 0.95 0.95 0.94 
 (0.23) (0.22) (0.24) 
Household income Estimated household income 5.33 5.01 6.04 
 (Rs. 1000) (3.89) (3.28) (4.92) 
Note:  Standard errors in parentheses. 
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Figure 1.  Choice of optimal length of time in school for parents interested in 
maximizing net present value. 
 
Case A: Returns to promotion raise time in school 
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Case B: Returns to promotion lower time in school 
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